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Abstract 
This paper considers the problem of designing PES-type contracts to encourage participation 
and spatial coordination amongst private forest owners in Finland. The aim of the policy is to 
increase efforts to mitigate risks from invasive forest pests and diseases. Such control actions 
yield spill-over benefits to other landowners and to wider society, meaning that the level of 
privately-optimal disease control is likely to be less than the socially-optimal level. The policy 
designer may wish to encourage spatial coordination in the uptake of such PES-type contracts, 
as spatial coordination delivers an increase in the effectiveness of control measures on disease 
risks. We conducted a choice experiment with private forest owners in Finland in October 2016. 
The study elicited the preferences of woodland owners with respect to the design of forest 
disease control contracts, and gauged their willingness to cooperate with neighbouring forest 
owners within the framework of such programs. 
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1. Introduction 
Invasive diseases are becoming more common world-wide due to expansions in global trade, 
increasing specialisation of production, and climate change (Florec et al., 2013: Freer-Smith 
and Webber, 2015). For forests, invasive pests and diseases such as emerald ash borer, oak 
processionary moth, sudden oak death (Phytophthora ramorum) and red band needle blight 
(Dothistroma septosporum) are capable of greatly reducing the flow of benefits from 
ecosystem services such as timber production, recreation amenities and carbon 
sequestration (Boyd et al., 2013). In many cases, costly control actions are available which 
either reduce the risks of a disease arriving, or reduce its rate of spread or survival once 
arrived. These control actions include thinning, clear-felling, public access restrictions (some 
diseases are spread by recreational users), and the spraying of biocides.  
Where such pests and diseases (diseases, from now on) affect privately-owned land, it is 
likely that the extent of control actions which private landowners find it profitable to 
undertake are less than those which would be socially optimal. This is because such control 
actions, which incur costs to the private landowner, generate public good benefits such as 
maintaining recreation and aesthetic values enjoyed by forest visitors, and reducing risks of 
disease to other forest owners, in addition to the private benefits to the forest owner 
(Epanchin-Niell, 2017). Since the social benefits of disease control in forests can outweigh 
the private benefits to the landowner, there is an argument for implementing a Payment for 
Ecosystem Service-type scheme to incentivise landowners to engage in more disease control, 
and using general tax revenues to fund payments under such a scheme (Hanley et al., 2012). 
As with any Payments for Ecosystem Service (PES) scheme, an important question is how to 
design contracts offered to landowners (Engel, 2016). The policy designer is likely to be 
concerned with a range of criteria including how many landowners are incentivised to 
participate in the scheme (given that participation is voluntary) and the ecological benefits 
from participation. Participation in turn has been shown to be related to contract design 
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details such as the length of contracts offered, the level of monitoring required, and what 
management changes a landowner is required to make (Kuhfuss et al., 2016; Broch and 
Vedel, 2011). 
This paper employs the Choice Modelling approach to investigate the willingness of forest 
owners in Finland to participate in a PES-type programme to promote actions to reduce the 
expected economic costs of invasive pests and diseases. In particular, we are interested in 
how spatial coordination amongst those choosing to participate can be enhanced, since such 
spatial coordination in forest management activities is thought to result in more effective 
landscape-level risk reductions in this specific instance of forest pest and disease control 
involving neighbour-to-neighbour spillovers (Fenichel et al., 2014; Ma et al., 2018). 
Moreover, economists have become increasingly interested in the general question of how 
to motivate spatial coordination in the provision of environmental benefits from land 
management (Banerjee et al., 2017). 
2. Previous work 
2.1. Choice modelling and PES design 
Choice Modelling has been widely used to estimate the relative importance of contract 
design factors influencing the potential up-take of PES-type schemes, both by farmers and 
foresters (Christensen et al., 2011). Choice modelling is commonly implemented in a stated 
preference format1, asking land managers how they would respond to different PES 
contracts differentiated in terms of their contract attributes. Villanueva et al. (2017), for 
example, list 54 existing studies which use a stated preference approach to estimate how 
much landowners demand to participate in PES-type schemes; and how stated participation 
varies with other contract design features. Our paper contributes to this literature by 
studying potential participation in a programme designed to reduce risks from invasive 
pests and diseases; and by considering the ways in which an agglomeration bonus influences 
                                                          
1 Note that it is possible to apply choice modelling to revealed preference data. In the current context, this would 
imply the need to describe variation in uptake of actual PES schemes for invasive pests and disease control as a 
function of scheme characteristics.  
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predicted participation. The advantages of a stated preference choice modelling approach in 
this context are that (i) a wide variety of scheme designs can be studied (ii) new schemes 
which have not yet been implemented can be evaluated in terms of their potential 
effectiveness; and (iii) farmer or forest manager heterogeneity in response can be modelled. 
The disadvantages of choice modelling include any systematic differences between stated 
(hypothetical) decisions by land managers and their actual decisions should such a scheme 
be offered (Johnston et al., 2017), although the determinants or the size of any such 
hypothetical bias has yet to be determined in a PES uptake context. 
Choice modelling in a stated preference context has also been implemented to understand 
public preferences for invasive species control. For example, Sheremet et al. (2017) quantify 
the public benefits of forest disease control using choice modelling. They find that the UK 
general public are, on the whole, willing to pay for government funding of actions to reduce 
the spread of invasive pests and diseases in UK forests, but that this willingness to pay 
depends strongly on which ecosystem benefits from forests are most affected, who owns 
affected forests, and which specific control measures are implemented. 
 
2.2. Spatial coordination in PES 
The efficiency of measures aimed at controlling the spread of forest pest and pathogens 
depend partly on whether the disease-controlling efforts of different forest owners and 
managers are coordinated in time and at specified locations (Epanchin-Niell and Wilen, 
2012). For example, failing to take effective control actions at a neighbouring forest may 
mean a plot becoming re-infected after being treated. This reflects a more general finding on 
the desirability of spatial coordination in responses to invasive species, in order to improve 
the effectiveness of control measures (Sims et al., 2016). These spatial aspects of the control 
problem motivate the inclusion of an agglomeration bonus in the choice experiment 
employed in our study. 
The importance of coordinating the efforts of participants in environment protection 
programs has been extensively discussed in the literature on payment for ecosystem 
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services (PES) schemes. Merckx et al. (2009), Dallimer et al. (2010) and Wätzold et al. (2010) 
show that spatially coordinated uptake of PES contracts results in greater biodiversity 
conservation benefits on farmland, and Windle et al. (2009) find that it improves prospects 
for restoration of native vegetation in Australia.  
Mattsson and Vacik (2017), in their survey of managers of several European protected areas, 
find that although invasive species is the second most important threat to maintaining 
biodiversity and ecosystem services over the next decade (preceded by only climate change), 
managers are not inclined to view stakeholder coordination of conservation efforts as a very 
effective instrument against this threat. Cooperation with adjacent protected areas is 
perceived as more effective against human-related threats, such as forest conversion or 
illegal hunting and collecting. Such cooperation will have more chances if coordinated at the 
regional level, by municipalities or local communities.  Stallman (2011) presents a 
framework for prioritising ecosystem services provided by agriculture in terms of the 
potential for their collective provision, and classifies pest control (for both endemic and 
invasive pests, presumably) as highly-suited to collective provision. In a follow-up study, 
Stallman and James (2015) identify factors which would most encourage farmers in 
Missouri, USA to cooperate locally over pest control. This paper is part of a wider literature 
addressing land managers’ willingness to cooperate with each other to produce 
environmental goods, including Sutherland et al. (2012) and Austin et al. (2014). 
However, Banerjee et al. (2014) found that encouraging spatial coordination using PES-type 
incentives can be challenging, partly due to the coordination game created by offering 
potential scheme participants an agglomeration bonus2 (Parkhurst et al., 2002; Parkhurst 
and Shogren, 2007).  The agglomeration bonus is a 2-part payment scheme whereby a 
participation payment is offered to any landowner joining the scheme with an additional 
bonus paid if one or more of that landowner’s neighbours also participate.  Experimental 
studies have shown that, whilst the agglomeration bonus can achieve target levels and 
patterns of spatial participation (Parkhurst and Shogren, 2007), the performance of such a 
                                                          
2 An alternative incentive design to encourage spatial coordination in PES-type schemes is a conservation auction 
where extra points are awarded to bids made with neighbours (Krawczyk et al, 2016). 
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scheme depends on factors such as the number of landowners in a neighbourhood, 
information flows between neighbours, and transactions costs (Banerjee et al., 2014, 2017). 
In the choice experiment described below we included an agglomeration bonus in the 
contract design to examine its effect on predicted participation levels. This builds on work 
by Villanueva et al. (2015), who included an attribute distinguishing individual versus 
collective participation in a PES-scheme for olive growers in Spain. 
3. Methods 
3.1. Description of the case study 
Finland is the most forested country in Europe, with 86% of its land area covered by forests. 
Forest ownership is very fragmented. There are over 600,000 non-industrial private forest 
owners (14% of the population), who own majority of the forests (around 60%). The average 
size of a private forest holding is about 30 hectares (Finnish Forest Association, 2018). Thus, 
the behaviour of private forest owners is likely to be pivotal in forest disease management. 
Private forests are often managed for timber production, but forest owners typically have 
multiple objectives. Private forest owners also value non-monetary aspects, such as nature, 
landscape and recreation (Hänninen et al., 2011; Karppinen, 2000; Takala et al., 2017). This 
relates to the fact that Finnish forests (including private) have open access. The “everyman’s 
right” enables the active usage of private forests for outdoor recreation. For example, nine 
out of ten close-to-home recreational visits are taken in areas with forests (Sievänen and 
Neuvonen, 2011).  
Finnish forests are part of the European boreal forest zone dominated by conifers. So far, 
pests and diseases have not caused extensive forest damage in Finland, but damages are 
expected to increase in future due to climate change (Subramanian et al., 2016). The most 
notable forest pathogen is currently Heterobasidion butt and root rot that is common in 
southern Finland, damaging especially spruce trees but also pines (Mattila and Nuutinen, 
2007). Non-native species are new threats facing Finland’s forests. Climate change will likely 
bring pests (e.g. nun moth) from southern Europe first to the southern regions of Finland 
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and then further up north. Similarly, prevalence of indigenous pest and diseases such as root 
rot is also increasing in the north due to climate change. 
Forest management activities make an important contribution to the increased incidence of 
Heterobasidion through summer cutting operations, whereas spruce bark beetles utilize 
non-removed susceptible trees for breeding (Nevalainen, 2017). Many control actions are 
available to either reduce the risks of a disease arriving or reduce its rate of spread or 
survival once arrived (Möykkynen and Pukkala, 2000; Nevalainen, 2017), but it is not known 
how forest owners are currently responding these control options. Even though a PES-type 
programme to promote actions to reduce the expected economic costs of invasive pests and 
diseases is unfamiliar for Finnish forest owners, they have experience with the “Trading in 
Natural Values” PES mechanism designed for biodiversity conservation since 2003 (Horne, 
2006; Juutinen et al., 2008; Mäntymaa et al., 2009). Furthermore, the coordination of forest 
management actions is not a totally new practice, as the Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry has funded several small-scale projects of cooperative networks aiming at 
increasing forest conservation on private lands in cooperation with a wide range of different 
forestry and conservation actors (Borg et al., 2015). Finnish forest owner preferences for 
cooperative management actions, however, have not been examined previously. 
Coordination of forest owners’ stand management activities is highly important because pest 
and diseases may easily spread, for example via roots (mycelia) and via basidiopores, from 
a focal stand to adjacent stands that are often owned by different landowners due the 
fragmented ownership. 
 
3.2. Survey design 
The survey consisted of three parts. Part A contained the description of four tree diseases 
that are currently most prevalent in Finnish forests and several questions about the 
respondents’ perceptions of their ability to control of forest diseases, as well as preferred 
roles for the national government in such control activities. The respondents were also 
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prompted to state their expectations about the possible spread of existing and new diseases 
in their own forests and across Finland. 
Part B contained the choice experiment. Its initial design was defined in discussion with 
forest experts in the UK and Finland and then pretested with a small group of Finnish forest 
owners in order to select both the attributes and attribute levels that would be most relevant 
for a possible disease management scheme in Finland. This pre-test also examined the most 
understandable way to present the choice situations to respondents. To gauge the degrees 
of importance and attention that the respondents assigned to each attribute while answering 
choice situations, at the end of the choice experiment the respondents were asked to answer 
several debriefing questions. For those who chose the opt-out (no contract) option in all 
choice cards, they were asked to specify their reasons for this selection. Second, the 
respondents ranked attributes of the choice situations according to their perceived 
importance to them. Third, the respondents were invited to indicate whether they thought 
about all the features of the hypothetical disease control contracts and to identify the 
attributes that were not considered at all while making decisions in choice situations. We 
stress that this question asked about the self-stated complete attribute non-attendance and 
not just a lower degree of attention, and the respondents were allowed to identify any 
relevant number of ignored attributes. Finally, respondents were asked what part of their 
forest they would be willing to enrol in a forest disease control program that would be 
similar to one of the programs offered in the choice situations. 
In Part C the respondents were asked several questions about their background and 
demographic details.  A separate group of questions aimed to assess their experience and 
involvement with forestry, their goals in woodland management, and the extent of their 
existing interactions and cooperation with their forest neighbours.  
In the choice experiment (Part B) the respondents were presented with several sets of 
possible forest disease management schemes and prompted to choose one in each set. An 
example choice card is shown in Figure 1. The underlying assumption behind the proposed 
schemes is that the government would be willing to offer forest owners monetary incentives 
for them to undertake disease control actions which go beyond current regulatory 
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requirements for disease and pest management, and beyond actions which are privately 
profitable. The choice situations were described in terms of the most likely features such 
schemes might consist of in the future. Five attributes (shown in Table 1) characterize each 
choice situation: specific disease management options, contract length in years, inspection 
and reporting frequency, annual grant (participation) payment per hectare per year, and an 
agglomeration bonus payment per hectare per year if at least one neighbouring forest owner 
also enrols.  
These disease management options were described as preventive actions implemented to 
reduce spread and potential damage from tree diseases and pests. Respondents were 
reminded that all management options are costly for forest owners. Each disease control 
option affects the spread of the tree diseases or pests differently. The first two options, 
‘avoiding timber harvesting during summer’ and ‘avoiding thinning’, reduce the risk of 
spreading the diseases by preventing mechanical impact of the harvesting actions on soil and 
injuries to the remaining trees, which would otherwise make the forest stand more 
susceptible to diseases. Timber harvesting actions conducted in wintertime inflict much less 
damage to the stand compared to similar actions during the summer. The ‘avoiding thinning’ 
option has also an advantage of maintaining a diversified forest, which may help in keeping 
disease outbreaks under control. The next disease control action, ‘removing damaged and 
dead trees from forest stands’, prevents future damages caused by pests (e.g. spruce bark 
beetles) and diseases before the next tree generation emerges. The last option, ‘stump 
treatment with protectants’3  after tree felling in summertime, is an effective management 
option against butt and root rot.  
The contract length was varied from 5 to 30 years based on the following considerations. On 
one side, from the ecological perspective long contracts are preferable to short ones for 
controlling the spread of tree diseases and pests. On the other, the average length of forest 
ownership in Finland is around 23 years (Finnish Forest Association, 2018), and forest 
owners may not be willing to make inter-generational commitments, thus preferring short 
                                                          
3 To prevent the spread of the butt and root rot, the Finnish government in spring 2016 established a 
requirement for forest owners to apply stump treatments in spruce- and pine- dominated forests located in the 
specific risk areas, harvested during the May-November period. 
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contracts (Horne, 2006). The inspection and reporting frequency attribute was set to either 
once every year or once every second year. Such a choice is based on the considerations that 
inspections are not possible during winter and that the size of forest holdings can be quite 
large for more frequent survey visits to be feasible. The levels of the annual grant payment 
were determined based on previous studies (e.g. Juutinen et al., 2008) and comments from 
experts. Agglomeration (neighbour participation) bonus levels were set using this 
distribution of annual grant payments. 
We generated a Bayesian D-efficient design4 consisting of 36 choice situations, or cards, 
divided further into six blocks. Each card contains two alternative disease control schemes 
and an opt-out option. The design was generated in Ngene software using the multinomial 
logit as the base model, with the D-error being 0.02 for the final design. The priors for the 
model’s parameter were taken from an earlier pilot study of UK forest owners undertaken 
by the authors, under the assumptions of certain similarities in forest composition, forest 
owners’ objectives, and characteristics of possible disease control contracts in two countries. 
In addition, the parameters for two attributes (the disease control measures and the bonus 
for inviting neighbours) were modelled as random parameters with normally distributed 
priors. 
During the experiment, each respondent is randomly assigned to one of the design blocks 
and asked to make choices over each of six cards in that block. Prior to answering actual 
choice cards, the respondents were provided with an example choice card (Figure 1) and 
with interpretations of each of the alternative disease control scheme presented in that card. 
We explained that the respondents would see a series of choice cards that included two 
hypothetical disease control contracts (contract A and contract B) and an opt-out option.  
Then we asked them to consider a forest stand where clear felling or thinning could be done, 
and a situation when a new forest disease would likely inflict some damage on their 
woodland in next five years (as the choice experiment was not specific to a particular disease, 
                                                          
4 A design that has a sufficiently low D-error (which is equal to the determinant of the asymptotic variance-
covariance matrix of a model estimated from simulated choices) is called a D-efficient design. In the efficient 
designs parameter prior values are assumed to be known and fixed. However, there is always some uncertainty 
surrounding true parameter values. To account for this uncertainty, we used a Bayesian D-efficient design, 
which assumes random rather than fixed priors (Scarpa and Rose, 2008; Ferrini and Scarpa, 2007). 
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we could not provide more detail on expected damages). The respondents were requested 
to choose the best disease control alternative in every card independently of others, or to 
select the opt-out option if they were not willing to select either of the offered contracts in 
some cards. 
3.3. Sampling 
The questionnaires were mailed in October 2016 to 1510 Finnish non-industrial private 
forest owners who were randomly selected from the Finnish Forest Centre’s database. We 
received back 243 completed questionnaires, which is 16 percent response rate. There was 
only one mailing round without any subsequent reminders. An internet survey was not 
thought to be a good option, due to previous experience in surveying private forest owners 
in Finland5.  
3.4. Econometric specification 
The modelling of preferences elicited through choice experiments is based on the 
assumption that a respondent maximizes their utility through their choices over the 
alternatives presented in a series of choice cards. The standard reference for the application 
of utility theory to discrete choice experiments is Train (2009). One of the most widely used 
models to analyse choice data is the random parameters logit model, also called the mixed 
logit (MXL) model, as its specification is versatile enough to represent a wide spectrum of 
respondent choice behaviour. The model formulation builds on the multinomial logit model 
(MNL), in which the utility to an individual i  from selecting an alternative j in a choice 
situation t  described by K  observed attributes 
1 ,..{ }., Kijt ijt ijtxxx is defined by the formula: 
 /ijt j ijtijtU     β x   
                                                          
5 Hänninen et al. (2011) conducted an extensive survey for Finnish non-industrial private forest owners where 
both mail and online versions were available. In this survey, only 5.5% of the respondents filled in the online 
survey while the rest 94.5% preferred the mail version. 
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where 
j  is an alternative-specific constant,   are attribute weights, ijt  is the i.i.d. extreme 
value idiosyncratic error, and  is its scale, normalized to 1 in the MNL model.  
The probability for such a choice is then defined as: 
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 In the MXL model the individual-specific preference parameters   and choice-specific 
constants   are no longer fixed for all respondents, but vary around means and are modelled 
as follows: 
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and where 
j  is an alternative-specific constant, and ij  is normally distributed (with zero 
mean) heterogeneity of the choice-specific constants; 
k  is the population mean of k-
attribute coefficient, 
ik  is the individual specific heterogeneity of a taste parameter, which 
in this paper is assumed to follow the normal distribution with zero mean. The means of the 
parameter distributions of ik  and ik  are also allowed to be heterogeneous with 
respondents’ individual characteristics iz , which enter the formulas for taste parameters 
and constants with vectors of weights k  and j , respectively. These characteristics include 
two subsets: first, M observed demographic characteristics ig  (such as age, gender, 
education, and income), and second, N variables that reflect self-reported experience and 
expectations of the respondents and their knowledge about forest pests and diseases as well 
as their willingness to cooperate their efforts to control disease spread. In our experiment, 
choice situations are characterized by attributes that can be best represented as categorical 
variables with several levels. To account for this, each attribute with kL  levels is modelled as 
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a set of ( 1)kL  dummies, where each dummy corresponds to one level of a categorical 
variable.  
In this paper, analysis of the choices of forest owners and managers over disease control 
programmes is complemented with the analysis of their self-reported perceptions and 
attitudes towards tree diseases, and assessments of the risks of disease spread. Some of these 
attitude variables are used to form interaction terms in the choice model. As noted by e.g. 
Ashok et al. (2002), Daly et al. (2012) and others, stated attitudinal indicators are often 
latently dependent on other observed or unobserved variables, for example socio-
demographic characteristics of the respondents, which may lead to endogeneity issues in the 
model estimation. In addition to this endogeneity problem, Chorus and Kroesen (2014) 
pointed out that cross-sectional attitudinal variables cannot be used to derive preference 
management policies. As neither attitudes nor attitude-related policies are the main focus of 
this paper, and as some of the choice attributes are often externally pre-determined, we do 
not use the hybrid latent variable choice models, as suggested by Ben-Akiva et al. (2002), 
Bolduc et al. (2005) or Hess (2012). At the same time, we take extra care to keep the analysis 
of attitudes, perceptions, and knowledge of tree diseases at the inter-respondent level. 
4. Results 
4.1. Sample characteristics 
The socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents in our sample are reported in 
Table 2. As there is no census information available regarding Finnish forest owners, for 
comparison we provide the results from a regularly conducted and extensive Finnish forest 
owner survey, the most recent edition of which covers the period 2007-2009 (Hänninen et 
al., 2011). 
In our sample, the average age (58 years) and gender structure (72.5 percent males) are 
similar to those reported in Hänninen et al. (2011). Although the reference study used 
somewhat different income grades compared to our questionnaire, we still can conclude that 
that high income households are to some extent overrepresented in our sample (almost 28 
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percent of respondents have income higher than 6,000 €/month), while the low income 
households are relatively underrepresented. Similarly, our sample has disproportionally 
more respondents with a university degree (about 24 percent) at the expense of the 
respondents who completed only basic education, compared to the education distribution in 
the reference study6. In terms of the professional status of forest owners in our study, the 
sample adequately represents employees (32 percent of respondents) and entrepreneurs 
(17 percent), although the proportion of pensioners (44 percent) is slightly lower than their 
share in the reference sample. In addition, 19 percent of respondents indicated that their job 
is connected to agriculture or forestry. 
The average forest area owned by the respondents (56.5 ha) in our sample is about 26 
percent higher compared to the forest area in Hänninen et al. (2011). The woodlands in the 
possession of the respondents are mainly either coniferous (47 percent) or mixed (44 
percent). There are predominantly two forms of forest ownership in Finland: forests belong 
to either families (43 percent) or to estates and unions (44 percent). Respondents in our 
sample seem to have accumulated considerable experience with forests, as on average the 
respondents have owned their forest estates for about 25 years, whilst 71 percent stated that 
they undertake silvicultural actions in their woodlands themselves. This finding is in line 
with previous research (Parviainen et al., 2014). 
When asked about their forest management objectives (see Table 3), 80 percent of 
respondents stated timber production as one of their goals, and 56 percent named it as the 
most important objective. Notably, timber was considered either as a source of firewood (31 
percent) or as an additional small (i.e. 5-20 percent of the total) source of income (38 percent 
of respondents). Other frequently mentioned purposes of managing a forest are preservation 
of wildlife or biodiversity (54 percent, including 20 percent considering this as the top-most 
management objective), provision of recreational possibilities (mentioned by 37 percent), 
                                                          
6 It is important to remember that the reference sample describes the profile of Finnish forest owners in 2007-
2009, and therefore, quite some changes could have happened in the past years. For example, the average age 
of Finnish forest owners is quite high. Hence the then-oldest forest owners may not own their forests anymore 
or many of them might have died. Those individuals likely had low education and low income levels, compared 
to a younger generation. Similarly, they were often agricultural entrepreneurs or pensioners. The differences 
indicate, however, that our sample might not be fully representative, so may create difficulties for generalizing 
the survey’s results. 
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and maintaining the visual attractiveness of the landscape (40 percent). This multi-objective 
results is supported by Hänninen et al. (2011), Karppinen (2000) and Takala et al. (2017). 
The respondents were also asked a series of questions about their willingness to discuss 
issues related to forest management with neighbours, or to cooperate in taking actions 
against forest diseases, or to share equipment in the process of maintaining their forests 
(Table 4). Based on their answers, we conclude that the respondents only rarely discuss 
forest-related questions or share their equipment with their neighbours. Furthermore, the 
majority of respondents prefer to cooperate in their efforts to control disease spread at the 
regional level only (as opposed to local cooperative actions) or to take the relevant measures 
independently. However, there could be a natural explanation for these findings: the average 
distance to a house of the nearest neighbour is 56km, which might make it rather difficult to 
frequently interact with neighbouring forest owners. 
There is a clear split in the sample with respect to self-evaluation of respondents’ tree 
diseases knowledge (Table 5). About 38 percent somewhat agree or strongly agree with a 
statement that they “know tree diseases well”, but a somewhat larger proportion, 44 percent, 
disagree with such a statement. Some 61 percent think that there is enough information 
about tree diseases available. Another interesting finding is that while the respondents at 
large (65 percent) are ready to change their forest management practices in response to 
increased threat of forest diseases, it should be the government that determines which 
actions should be taken and which pays for these actions, according to the views of 70-78 
percent of respondents. Only one third of respondents think they have enough decision-
making power over the issue of forest diseases. Further, a large share of respondents (one 
quarter) did not have any opinion on this matter, which might indicate that forest owners 
are not aware about the required practices related to forest disease management. 
The impact of existing diseases in Finnish forests (Table 6) seems to be relatively small so 
far. Only about 25% of respondents say their woodlands are already affected by tree 
diseases, and a further 5-16 percent of the affected forest owners notice any visible damage 
from the diseases. In their projections about the future, about 40 percent of the respondents 
believe their forests will unlikely be affected by the existing diseases in the next 10 years. On 
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the other hand, people are significantly more concerned about the potential risk of new 
diseases, as 59-65 percent think that it is likely that a new disease affecting either conifers 
or broadleaves will arrive in Finland in the near future. However, expectations of the 
resulting damage are not very high, even if there will be no grant-supported disease control 
schemes: 72 percent think that the diseases will damage less than one third of their forest 
stand, and moreover, 30% of respondents think the damage will not exceed 10 percent of 
the stand. 
4.2. Choice analysis 
The full sample of 243 respondents who completed the survey is reduced for the analysis of 
choice experiment data, as 57 respondents (24% of the full sample) preferred to choose the 
opt out in every choice situation; whilst 9 respondents answered the survey questions but 
did not complete the choice experiment part. For the serial opt-out respondents, analysis 
shows that their decisions are mainly based on two reasons: either unwillingness to sign up 
for such forest disease control schemes, or unwillingness to consider forest diseases as 
significant threats to their forests. Further analysis of the serial opt-out choices with a 
binomial logit model (reported in Table A1 in the Appendix) reveals that higher probability 
of choosing the opt-out option in all choice situations is significantly positively correlated 
with the respondents’ willingness to decide independently on the control actions for forest 
diseases (as opposed to cooperation at local or regional levels), and negatively correlated 
with their age, readiness to share forestry equipment with neighbours, acknowledging 
imperfect knowledge about tree diseases, high expectations of a new disease affecting 
conifers arriving in the next 10 years, and expectations of a high probable damage to their 
forests if they do not join a government-subsidized disease control scheme. 
The remaining subsample of people who did not choose the opt out in every choice card 
provides us with 1060 choice data points for preference analysis. Choices between two 
alternative disease control programs included in each choice card are symmetric, as each 
contract is selected in 39% of choice situations. In the remaining 22% of choices, the 
respondents preferred the opt-out option.  
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The post-experiment ranking of the subjective importance of choice situation attributes 
(Table 7) indicates that two attributes, ‘frequency of inspection visits’, and ‘bonus for inviting 
your neighbour’, are rated as the least important. These attributes are not only ranked the 
lowest on average, but also are by far the least likely to be named as the most important 
attributes by any respondent: only 5-6% of respondents would do so, compared to e.g. 62% 
of respondents placing specific disease control measures at the top of the rank. Similarly, 
these two attributes are most frequently mentioned as being not considered during the 
choice-making process. However, the extent of this self-stated attribute non-attendance 
seems to be rather low, as even the two most frequently non-attended attributes are 
excluded during decision making by only 10-15 percent of the respondents. Thus we neither 
explicitly account for a possible impact of stated attribute non-attendance on the model 
estimates nor explore inferred attribute non-attendance in what follows. 
We estimated a number of models over respondent choices, starting from a multinomial logit 
to a simple attributes-only mixed logit, to different models that include interactions with 
demographic, disease knowledge, and behavioural variables. Three of these models are 
presented in Table 8. The best statistical fit is reported by a MIXL model with interactions 
related to the respondents’ evaluation of the current disease situation and their expectations 
about future developments in disease risks. Interestingly, other possible interactions of the 
Status Quo (SQ) utility level or ‘bonus’ attribute weight with demographic, disease 
knowledge, or counter-disease cooperation variables are not significant. We have also 
estimated a number of models that allow for scale heterogeneity, but results do not 
statistically outperform the non-scaled models and so are not reported here.   
The first model that we report is a multinomial logit (MNL) model. The estimate of the 
alternative-specific constant (ASC) has negative sign, which means that the respondents 
derive higher utility from subscribing to some grant-financed disease control scheme than 
not joining any scheme. In addition, it can also indicate possible dislike for the ‘no thinning’ 
disease control option. The estimates of other control measures have positive signs, so they 
are more preferred relative to ‘no thinning’ option, which is the omitted level for this 
attribute. The highest ranked control option is ‘remove damaged and dead trees’, followed 
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by ‘chemical treatment of stumps’, and ‘avoiding summer logging’. This relative ranking of 
the disease control measures is retained in other, more sophisticated models. The ‘length of 
contract’ coefficient is negative and significant, which means that the respondents dislike 
longer disease-control programmes. A possible explanation for this can be that a longer 
contract is perceived as an unwanted constraint on a forest owner’s freedom to manage her 
forest, i.e. for a possibility to cut and sell or hold her stand untouched depending on the 
timber market conditions and not on the prescriptions of the disease control contract. In this 
model, the ‘neighbour bonus’ coefficient is significant, but has a negative sign, which can be 
a reflection of dislike or at least considerable variability of respondent preferences about 
disease control contracts that depend on actions of many other participants. We study this 
issue in detail in more advanced models below. As expected, the ‘grant payment’ coefficient 
is positive and highly significant.  
In an attribute-only mixed logit (MIXL) model, which accounts for individual variability of 
attribute coefficients, the utility of the opt-out option is not significantly different from zero. 
Other utility weights, with the exception of ‘neighbour bonus’, are much higher than the 
coefficients in the MNL model. The ‘neighbour bonus’ coefficient estimate is not significant, 
but the attribute’s distribution has a statistically significant variance across the sample.  
The estimate for the ‘inspection frequency’ utility coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero. We observed the same outcome for other parametrizations of this attribute in all 
estimated models: this finding mirrors the main conclusion reached in a study of Spanish 
farmers by Villanueva et al (2015). Moreover, the estimated standard deviation of the 
parameter’s individual values around the sample mean is also not statistically significant. We 
thus conclude that the frequency of inspection visits is not important for the respondents.  
One possible explanation for this finding is that the respondents perceived the suggested 
inspections to be relatively easy to do as they were already visiting their forest stands 
actively (71 percent stated that they undertake silvicultural actions in their forests 
themselves). Another explanation could be that the respondents lacked experience with 
respect to mandatory inspections and therefore this attribute did not affect their choices.  
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The last model we report in Table 8 is a MIXL model in which choice attributes are interacted 
with variables that reflect the respondents’ demographic characteristics as well as their 
experience and expectations about forest diseases. Only three interaction terms are 
significant and thus reported in the table. The first term shows that the respondents whose 
forest stands are already affected by a disease are less sensitive to the size of the neighbour 
bonus offered in a disease control contract. The second interaction term tells us that 
respondents who expect existing forest diseases to spread more rapidly in the coming 10 
years are less sensitive to the size of the neighbour bonus, as their bonus coefficient estimate 
is lower than the estimate for the rest of the sample7. That is, for respondents who are more 
aware of the risks of forest diseases, other characteristics of a disease control contract (e.g. 
contract length) become more important. The last interaction term indicates that the grant 
payment has a relatively larger weight in the utility functions of those respondents who 
prefer local-level cooperation with their neighbours. Perhaps these forest owners already 
have good working relations with the owners of neighbouring forests, and so for them the 
complementary neighbour bonus looks almost as certain as the contract payment. 
It is possible that the variables describing  respondents expectations about future forest 
diseases and their attitudes to cooperating with neighbours may be correlated with 
unobserved (latent) individual attitudes, such as awareness about increasing number of 
threats to plants in general, or concern about increasing negative pressures on the nature, 
which also co-determine their preferences for a PES-type contract. In this case, our 
interaction variables, especially those with the neighbour bonus attribute, may be 
endogenous and thus inconsistently estimated, as noted in Hess et al (2013). The direction 
of the resulting bias depends on the nature of the latent variable and is difficult to predict, 
especially given the complex character of the interaction variables (see a related discussion 
in Train (2009), Chapter 13). It is also possible that the variance of the SQ constant is 
overestimated, as it may capture the covariance of the utility and latent variable error terms. 
However, the results of hybrid choice models are often hard to interpret. Table 8 thus 
                                                          
7 “Please rate, on a scale from 1 to 4, how likely you think it is that in the next 10 years the following existing pests 
and diseases will affect your forests (1 - very unlikely, 4 - very likely).”. The table listed the following diseases: Pine 
blister rust, European spruce bark beetle, Conifer root and butt rot, Havununna. 
7 
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provides estimates for our choice models with and without these possibly-endogenous 
attitudinal variables (high expectations of worse current diseases; prefer local cooperation). 
Note the improvement in model fit, however, in moving from a model without these 
attitudinal interaction terms to one which includes it. 
 
Predicting participation rates. 
We studied what impact possible changes in the neighbour bonus and a disease control 
contract’s duration have on the probability of forest owners selecting a contract that requires 
a particular disease control measure. We plot several curves for different combinations of 
neighbour bonus (0€ and 80€) and contract length (5 years and 30 years). 
First, let us look at contracts for different disease control measures, i.e. no thinning, removing 
dead trees, avoiding tree cutting during summer, and chemical treatment. Figure 2 shows 
choice probabilities based on the estimates that do not include the interactions terms for 
bonus attribute, i.e. on the model estimates for the respondents who do not expect an 
increase in the spread of existing tree diseases in the next 10 years or whose woodlands are 
not yet affected by tree diseases. The effect of changes in the neighbour bonus attribute on 
the choice probabilities is rather limited, while the effect of changes in the contract length 
attribute is much more pronounced. In particular, a contract with large bonus and short 
duration is the most likely to be accepted for any disease control measure and grant 
payment, while a long contract with small bonus has the lowest chances to be chosen. Such 
a high impact of the contract duration is most clearly observed for the contracts with the ‘no 
thinning’ control measure. We can also see that the ‘no thinning’ contract would require the 
largest monetary compensation for any given probability of signing such a contract. 
Curves in Figure 3 show the probabilities for contracts with ‘no thinning’ disease control 
measure based on the estimates for the model that includes two interaction terms. The first 
panel shows the probability curves without interactions, the second panel shows the 
probability curves for those respondents who indicated that an increase in spread of current 
diseases is very likely, and the third panel demonstrates the curves for the respondents 
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whose woodlands are already affected by tree diseases. Overall, these respondents require 
higher grant payments compared to the respondents who are neither affected by the current 
diseases nor expecting rapid further spread. As before, the evidence of a strong negative 
impact of the contract length attribute on the simulated choice probabilities is clearly visible. 
The role of neighbour bonus in the decisions of the respondents already affected by a disease 
is reduced, and furthermore, the neighbour bonus attribute seems to have no impact at all 
on the decisions of the respondents who expect an increase in the spread of the existing 
diseases. Especially in the model with interaction terms, for contracts with ‘no thinning’ 
control measure and with grant payments exceeding 100-150€ it is mostly the duration of 
contract that defines whether the contract will be likely accepted (simulated probability is 
close to one) or rather rejected (simulated probability is less than 0.5). 
Finally, Figure 4 shows the probability curves for the contracts with the option of ‘removing 
dead trees’ as the main disease control measure. As in the previous case, the impact of the 
neighbour bonus is either very limited or non-existent. Notably, the effect of the contract 
length is counterweighed by the contract payment: for small payments (below 100€) the 
length of the contract seems to be the single most important factor, while for large payments 
(above 200€) the contract length factor plays a very limited role in the respondent decisions. 
Overall, the contracts with the ‘remove dead trees’ option are more readily chosen. For any 
given probability of choosing a disease control contract the respondents require much 
smaller monetary payments compared to contracts with other control measures. Second, 
short contracts have very high probabilities of acceptance even for the lowest payment rates. 
This phenomenon can perhaps be explained by the fact that removing dead trees is often 
undertaken as a forest management operation, and is the lowest cost of the disease 
management options presented to the forest owners. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have analysed the willingness of forest owners to participate in a PES-type 
scheme aimed at reducing the spread of invasive pests and diseases. We motivated this from 
a recognition that privately-costly actions by forest owners to reduce disease risks generate 
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benefits to other forest owners and to the wider public, and maintain the flow of ecosystem 
service benefits in the face of invasive diseases and pests (Sims et al., 2016). Using choice 
modelling, we found that a large fraction of those forest owners who decided to participate 
in the survey were willing to participate in such a PES scheme. Most respondents preferred 
some contract to no contract. This could, to some degree, reflect a selection bias, in that 
people most willing to engage in such a scheme were more likely to return their surveys. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to quantify the size of any such bias in this instance. But the 
finding might also reflect the positive experiences of forest owners in Finland with 
innovative contract-based schemes aimed at protecting and enhancing biodiversity in 
Finnish forests (Juutinen et al., 2010).  
In terms of which aspects of a contract would increase stated participation, we found that 
shorter contracts with larger per-hectare payments increase participation. The latter has 
obvious implications for the budgetary cost of such a scheme to the government, and no 
estimate is provided here on the expected economic benefits of reductions in disease spread 
which could be compared with budgetary costs. That landowners prefer shorter PES 
contracts has been found in other studies (e.g. Broch and Vedel, 2011; Horne, 2006), and 
probably reflects a desire to maintain flexibility in management response and a concern with 
the resale value of farm or forest properties, but does reduce the likely environmental 
benefits of the scheme; since environmental benefits generated whilst the contract is in force 
may be lost when the contract ends (although see Kuhfuss et al., 2016b). 
In terms of which management options for disease risk reduction are most likely to be 
accepted by landowners, we found highest levels of support for the removal of 
damaged/dead trees and the use of chemicals. Actions which restrict timber harvesting are 
less accepted; moving to a “no thinning” regime as part of a PES contract is the least popular 
option, as thinning both provides current-period revenues and impacts on future revenues, 
due to the effects on forest growth rates. 
We also found very mixed evidence on the performance of an agglomeration or neighbour 
participation bonus, which has wider implications for the design of PES schemes. As argued 
above, the agglomeration bonus is one of the main mechanisms which economists have 
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developed to incentivise spatial coordination in uptake of PES schemes, where such 
coordination is desirable from an ecological viewpoint. Most studies to date have used 
context-free lab experiments to study the effectiveness of the AB in producing spatial 
coordination (e.g. Banerjee et al., 2014, 2017). In our choice experiment, actual forest owners 
made choices over realistic future policy options designed to encourage spatial coordination 
in disease and pest control. We found that the effects of the AB on intended participation 
depended very much on (i) whether a forest owner was already affected by a disease (ii) 
their expectations over how rapidly disease would spread in the future and (iii) their 
attitudes to the desirability of local cooperation in disease risk reductions. This makes the 
impacts of an AB introduced as part of a Payment for Ecosystem Service scheme much harder 
to predict, and also shows that motivations for uptake of a contract including an AB are much 
broader than those modelled to date in lab experiments. 
This also shows that the likelihood of local cooperation over responses to invasive pests and 
diseases seems very context-specific, and to be embedded in wider attitudes to cooperation 
with neighbours, as well as expectations over future production risks. Forest ownership in 
Finland is very fragmented (mean distance to nearest forest neighbour was 56km in our 
survey) and ownership is being increasingly concentrated in cities. Respondents in our 
survey revealed that they rarely cooperated with neighbours in terms of sharing equipment, 
and infrequently discuss forest management issues with neighbours.  This cultural context 
necessitates the development of new co-operation-enhancing instruments.  
Finally, it would seem to be important to consider the synergies and trade-offs between 
actions which reduce the risks/expected costs of invasive pests and diseases in forests with 
multiple objectives of forest management. There is some evidence that the willingness of the 
general public to fund the kinds of PES scheme modelled here depend on which benefits from 
a forest (recreational use, commercial, carbon storage, timber production…) are most 
impacted by a particular disease (Sheremet et al, 2017). Actions taken to reduce risks from 
a given disease may reduce or enhance the ability of a forest to supply some ecosystem 
services (e.g. if recreational access restrictions are imposed), or may decrease or increase 
forest biodiversity (Mönkkönen et al., 2014). This implies that any PES scheme for forest 
invasive pests and diseases should be designed in a manner which (i) is consistent with 
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maximising the net social benefit flows from a forest and (ii) which makes economic sense 
to forest owners in terms of how compensation matches the opportunity costs of 
participation. 
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Figure 1. An example choice card. 
CHOICE CARD 1 Contract A Contract B 
I would not want 
to sign either of 
these two 
contracts 
Disease management 
option 
removing 
damaged/dead trees 
avoiding timber 
harvesting in summer 
Contract length 5 years 30 years 
Inspection and 
reporting frequency 
once every year once every second year 
Grant payment rate 
(€/ha/year) 
70€ 120€ 
Bonus payment for 
bringing in neighbor 
forest owner 
(€/ha/year) 
80€ 0€ 
YOUR CHOICE: ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
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Figure 2. Simulated probabilities of subscribing to a disease control scheme for 
different control measures (the effect of interaction terms is not included) 
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Figure 3. Simulated probabilities of subscribing to a disease control scheme with ‘No 
thinning’ control measure (with different interaction terms) 
 
Note:  In the middle panel, two top and two bottom curves are merged. 
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Figure 4. Simulated probabilities of subscribing to a disease control scheme with 
‘Remove dead trees’ control measure (with different interaction terms) 
 
Note:  In the middle panel, two top and two bottom curves are merged. 
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Table 1. Attributes used to describe contract choice situations 
 
  
Attributes Levels 
Disease management options 
Avoiding timber harvesting during summer 
Avoiding thinning 
Stump treatment with protective chemicals 
during the summer tree felling 
Removing damaged and or dead trees 
Contract length (years) 5, 10, 20, 30  
Inspection and reporting frequency 
Once every year 
Once every second year 
Annual grant payment rate 
(€/ha/year) 
10€, 30€, 70€, 120€, 180€, 250€ 
Bonus payment to you for bringing 
in a neighboring forest owner 
(€/ha/year) 
0€, 10€, 20€, 40€, 60€, 80€ 
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Table 2. Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample. 
 
Sample 
Reference 
study 
Sample averages   
Age (years) 
Household size 
Total forest area owned (ha) 
58.2 
2.3 
56.5 
60.6 
 
34.5 
Sample shares (percent)   
Gender:   
   Female 
   Male 
27.5 
72.5 
25 
75 
Household’s gross income (€/month):   
   less than 2000 
   2000-3999 
   4000-5999 
   more than 6000 
9.2 
37.1 
26.2 
27.5 
21 
36 
23 
20 
Education:   
   Basic education 
   Matriculation examination or/and vocational 
degree  
   Polytechnic degree 
   University degree 
23.3 
29.2 
23.7 
23.7 
32 
35 
21 
12 
Professional status:   
   Employee 
   Entrepreneur 
   Pensioner 
   Other status 
32.3 
17.4 
44.3 
6.0 
31 
19 
47 
3 
Notes: 1. The reference study is Hänninen et al. (2011) Suomalainen metsänomistaja 2010, 
Metlan työraportteja 208. Accessible via: 
http://www.metla.fi/julkaisut/workingpapers/2011/mwp208.htm. ISBN 978-
951-40-2317-0. 
2. Our sample consists of 243 respondents, while Hänninen et al. (2011) counts 6318 
respondents, though the number of observations varies between questions. 
3. The annual income from Hänninen et al. (2011) for year 2007 was multiplied by index 
of wage and salary earnings to update it to 2016 and then divided by 12 to get a 
monthly figure. 
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Table 3. Forest ownership and management data 
Characteristics Sample 
General information  
Average duration of forest ownership (years) 25 
Total forest area owned (ha) 57 
Distance to nearest neighbour’s house (km) 56 
Sample shares (percent)  
Forest composition:  
conifers 47 
mixed 44 
Forest ownership:  
individual 9 
family 43 
estate or union 44 
Forest management objectives:  
timber production 80 
preservation of wildlife or biodiversity 54 
provision of recreational possibilities 37 
visual attractiveness of the landscape 40 
carbon storage 23 
other  10 
Top-ranked forest management objectives:  
timber production 56 
preservation of wildlife or biodiversity 20 
provision of recreational possibilities 4 
visual attractiveness of the landscape 7 
Timber production goals:  
no specific goal 19 
small-scale (e.g. firewood) 31 
timber revenues are 5-20% of income 38 
timber revenues are 21-40% of income 5 
timber revenues are >40% of income 2 
Notes: Respondents were allowed to select multiple forest management objectives. 
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Table 4. Two-way tables on willingness to discuss, cooperate, or to share equipment 
(percent) 
Cooperate Share equipment 
locally regionally 
locally + 
regionally 
stay 
independent 
never sometimes often 
Share 
equipment 
       
never 7 37 7 20    
sometimes 4 12 2 3    
often 0 0 0 0    
Discuss        
never 3 17 5 13 37 1 0 
sometimes 8 30 3 9 34 19 0 
often 0 3 1 1 3 2 0 
Notes:    1. The breakdown numbers are in percent, relative to the entire sample. 
 2. There are some missing data (about 4 percent), so the shares do not sum up to 100 in sub-tables. 
3. The questions are formulated as follows: 
A. How often do you discuss forest management issues with your neighbours? 
B. To what extent are you willing to cooperate in fight against forest diseases? 
C. How often do you share forestry equipment? 
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Table 5. Self-assessment of disease-related knowledge and powers 
(percent) 
Don’t 
know 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Perceptions about themselves       
I know forest diseases well 4 11 33 12 34 4 
Sufficient information is available 5 2 13 17 42 19 
Forest owners should change their 
management practices due to the 
proliferation of forest diseases 
7 2 8 14 41 24 
Forest owners have enough decision-
making power w.r.t. forest diseases 
24 3 14 22 25 9 
Perceptions about the state       
The state should determine how 
forest owners act on disease issues 
2 4 8 14 41 29 
The state should pay for costs of 
forest diseases prevention 
1 3 4 11 34 44 
Note:  1. The numbers are in percent relative to the entire sample.  
 2. About 4 percent answers are missing. 
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Table 6. Perceptions about the risk of existing and future diseases 
(percent) 
Already 
affected 
No or little 
visible 
damage* 
Don’t 
know 
Very 
unlikely 
Quite 
unlikely 
Quite 
likely 
Very 
likely 
Existing diseases        
pine blister rust 
(Cronartium flaccidum) 
25 95 12 16 26 14 2 
spruce bark beetle 
(Ips typographus) 
21 84 14 12 29 16 3 
root and butt rot 
(Heterobasidion annosum) 
26 91 13 17 22 17 0 
Havununna 
(Lymantria monacha) 
5 58 30 16 27 16 1 
New diseases        
A new disease affecting 
conifers will arrive 
  9 1 21 44 21 
A new disease affecting 
broadleaves will arrive 
  10 2 24 40 19 
Note:  1. The numbers are in percent relative to the entire sample.  
 2. About 5 percent answers are missing. 
 3. The numbers in the second column “No or little visible damage” are in percent relative to the sub-
sample of respondents whose woodlands are already affected by tree diseases. 
4. About 72 percent of respondents think the disease-related damage will not exceed 30 percent of 
their woodland stand. Moreover, about 30 percent of respondent actually expect the damage to be 
under 10 percent of their stand. 
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Table 7. Attribute ranking and non-attendance. 
(percent) 
Ranking Non-attendance 
Modal 
ranking 
Average 
ranking 
Top ranked* 
(subsample) 
Ignored         
(sample) 
Ignored*       
(subsample) 
Disease management options 1 1.8 62% 7% 2% 
Contract length 3 2.7 18% 29% 7% 
Inspection frequency 4 3.5 6% 42% 10% 
Grant payment 2 2.5 16% 18% 4% 
Bonus payment 5 4.2 5% 64% 15% 
Note:  1. Lower ranking numbers indicate higher importance of an attribute  
 2. The numbers in columns marked with asterisk (*) are in percent relative to the subsample of 
respondents who ignore at least one attribute in making their decisions. 
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Table 8. Estimation results for Multinomial and several Mixed Logit models 
 MNL MIXL MIXL + interact. 
Means    
ASC = U(SQ) + no thinning  -1.263*** (0.070) 0.427 (0.418) 0.743*  (0.435) 
Remove dead trees 1.862*** (0.141) 2.983*** (0.357) 3.035*** (0.346) 
No summer logging 1.552*** (0.139) 2.246*** (0.293) 2.154*** (0.288) 
Chemical treatment 1.806*** (0.140) 2.620*** (0.357) 2.771*** (0.373) 
Length of contract -0.047*** (0.005) -0.096*** (0.014) -0.104*** (0.015) 
Inspection frequency 0.014    (0.075) -0.034    (0.151) 0.016    (0.150) 
Grant payment             0.002*** (0.001) 0.016*** (0.003) 0.014*** (0.003) 
Neighbour bonus -0.004** (0.002) 0.004 (0.003) 0.014*** (0.004) 
Interactions    
Bonus * (affected by a disease) 
  
-0.010** (0.005) 
Bonus * (high expectations of 
worsening disease situation) 
  
-0.014*** (0.005) 
Grant * (prefer local 
cooperation) 
  
0.011*** (0.004) 
Std Dev    
SD (ASC)  2.340*** (0.345) 2.483*** (0.367) 
SD (Remove)  1.760*** (0.309) 1.662*** (0.316) 
SD (No Summer)  1.347*** (0.336) 1.673*** (0.359) 
SD (Chemical)  2.861*** (0.456) 2.754*** (0.397) 
SD (Length)  0.103*** (0.017) 0.119*** (0.018) 
SD (Inspection)  0.264   (0.257) 0.011    (0.242) 
SD (Grant)  0.009*** (0.003) 0.011*** (0.003) 
SD (Bonus)  0.010** (0.005) 0.004   (0.006) 
N.obs 3180 3180 3180 
AIC 3647.5 1717.0 1702.0 
Loglik -1815.7 -842.509 -831.998 
McFadden R2 0.103 0.276 0.286 
Notes:    1) ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Std errs are in parentheses. 
 2) Other models (not included here) indicate that the estimates for Inspection frequency are 
similarly not statistically significant if modelled via dummies per attribute level. 
  3) The omitted dummy for Disease management attribute level corresponds to Avoiding thinning. 
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 4) The MIXL and MIXL+interactions models are significantly different from each other according to 
Ben-Akiva and Swait (1986) test. 
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Table A1. Estimation results for Binomial Logit model of serial opt-out choices 
Variables (binomial logit, 1=opt-out in all choices) Estimates (std.err) 
Constant -0.547      (0.343) 
Age -0.001*    (0.0006) 
I want to decide independently on matters relating to the control 
of forest diseases (1=yes) 
0.865**   (0.363) 
How often do you share forestry equipment with your 
neighbours (1=sometimes or often, 0=never) 
-0.839*    (0.481) 
I know forest diseases well (1=strongly or somewhat disagree) -0.800**   (0.361) 
A new disease affecting conifers will arrive in 10 years (1=yes) -0.886*** (0.349) 
If there is no contract, assess the extent of probable destruction 
of your forest (on scale 10%-100%) 
-0.002*** (0.0006) 
N.obs 234 
LogLik -108.7 
Pseudo R2 0.164 
AIC 231.3 
 
 
